Relief For Cause

One of the big stories in the news these days is the relief of the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), one of the nation's 10 Nimitz-class aircraft carriers.  Since most of us have been sequestered in our homes, you likely have read about it in the news, seen various opinions on social media and even seen the viral YouTube video of the crew emotionally saying goodbye to the Skipper as he walks off the brow for the last time.  I have hesitated to comment on this story because of the emotions it raises and I wanted to wait until more was known.  As of today (4/4) there is a good deal out there in the public domain that paints a clearer picture than just a few days ago.  One thing for sure, this incident has motivated comment from all sides.  Some think he is a hero for looking out for his crew and some think he was an incompetent who panicked at the prospect of an epidemic aboard his ship.  The truth is likely somewhere in the middle.

Commanding Officers of U.S. Navy ships occupy a unique position in our society.  It goes back all the way to the beginning of seagoing nations.  Our Navy takes a lot of our rules, traditions and laws from the Royal Navy and it is inviolate in both services that the CO is ultimately, singly responsible for every aspect of his or her ship.  Every action, every person, every operation, every piece of equipment, every inspection, every evolution, everything.  The buck stops with the CO.  There are very few comparisons to it in civilian life.  In civilian life there are always equivocations.  There are always multiple aspects of a situation to take into account as evaluations are made as to the success or failure of any action.  Not so aboard a USN ship.  The Captain is ultimately responsible.  Full stop.

For context, during my Navy career I was in command of three organizations; two aviation squadrons and a wing (which is an organization that contains many squadrons).  I won't compare those commands with command of a ship at sea which is truly complex and unique, but nonetheless the same emotions arise when assuming command of any organization in the Navy.  It is a unique experience that happens instantaneously.  When I relieved the previous C.O. and assumed command in a ceremony for all to see, I immediately felt a sense of obligation and pride that was almost overwhelming.  As long as I was in command, I was totally responsible for everything and everyone in my organization.  Since the day of my swearing in to the Navy 14 years previously I had worked to achieve this position.  It was not to be taken likely.  Like most, I felt ready and was eager to assume the job.  Sometimes it was routine, sometimes it was incredibly difficult, sometimes maddening, and sometimes the pride was overwhelming.  It is not close to anything else I've done in my life.  I will take it to the end that I was a Commanding Officer in the U.S. Navy.  And speak to almost any Flag Officer and they will tell you that there is nothing that they have done in the Navy that compares with operational command.  

Periodically across our Navy and Marine Corps, CO's are relieved for cause.  It is usually announced that his or her immediate superior in command has lost confidence in the person and has elected to remove them from command.  The vast majority of the time there is no other reason given, only those in the loop know the details and it is always painful.  It could be anything from a personal failing (and we see more of that today as fraternization rules are strictly enforced), a failure of some key part of the organization, or even not executing a particular mission as ordered.  When this happens the command, the person and the Navy are impacted.  It is likely that there is a strong bond between the CO and the crew.  If the CO is removed for being abusive that may not be the case, but those kinds of removals are few and far between.  The crew will hate that it is happening and the command leadership will struggle to maintain good order and discipline in light of the traumatic impact on the command.  But it usually turns out okay.  And that is because the Navy is filled with superb leaders who understand the system and understand their place in it.  If things "go down sideways" they must be there to pick up the pieces.

Now to the situation at hand aboard TR.  She was on a routine Western Pacific/Indian Ocean deployment when the Covid 19 pandemic hit the U.S in full force.  When it was discovered that there were some in the crew infected there were no good answers.  The CO was in a difficult position, but that's what he is paid for.  He asked for and got permission to divert to Guam to try and solve the problem. Being in port was really the only answer to try and deal with this issue.  But as we’ve all seen and heard over the last few weeks, the only solution is social distancing.  That ain’t happening on a Navy ship.  Some say he could’ve moved people out of berthing to the hangar bay, limited sailors on the mess decks, etc.  But that's probably too tough.  The ship is not only filled with confined spaces but also loaded with 70+ aircraft from the Air Wing. I ASSUME he sent appropriate “high side” or classified messages to entire chain of command asking for help.  I ASSUME he sent “personal for” messages up the chain of command asking/begging for help.  I ASSUME he sent appropriate messages to National Command Authority describing the situation (a CVN is a national asset).  I ASSUME he was in communication on an hourly basis with his boss, the Strike Group Commander (SGC) who is a RADM and resides down the hall.  He was clearly at his wits end with what he perceived as the slowness/lack of response and said “fuck it, I’ll just send a letter laying out the whole sordid mess” including the condition and location of the ship.  And he sent it to an unclassified email list of between 20 and 30.  

He had to know that would get him relieved.  Had to.  But somewhere in his mind he let his concern for the crew overcome his obligation of command.  He was so invested in the well being of his crew that he forgot (or ignored) his obligation to command.  The truth is that there was a response in execution, but it wasn't urgent enough to suit him.  The truth was that the demographic of the 5000 sailors aboard TR is such that many of them would be ill, some would be severely ill, and few might even die.  That would be tragic but in the context of a capital ship of the nation on an overseas mission, that is the cost of doing business.  As has been famously said, "you don't go to war with what you want, you go to war with what you have".  He said in his letter that since we aren't at war, there was no justification to risk anyone.  That statement alone merits relief for cause.  As the CO of this awesome, capable, terrifying power, he needs to ensure that it is ready for anything, at any time.    If you're interested in reading the letter, you can find it here.  If there is a threat, no matter what it is, formulate a plan to deal with it as best you can and then press on.  But press on you must.  I've seen several articles from various sources providing analysis based on the same level or higher of experience that I possess.  Most express the same opinion that I believe.  A good one, if not a bit harsher is here. 

On the SECNAV side, I don’t see that he had any other choice.  SECNAV rightly said that relieving him had nothing to do with his pleas for help for his crew.  But SECNAC relieved him because he lost confidence in his judgement.  Hard to fault that when you read the letter, which was unclassified and leaked within about a nano-second of being released, detailing the impacts to the ship.  Below is SECNAV's statement and it lays out the issues pretty well.  I don't disagree with anything.   

WASHINGTON (NNS) -- Statement from the Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas B. Modly, regarding the relief of the Commanding Officer of USS Theodore Roosevelt.

Good afternoon. Thank you again for your diligence and courage in keeping the American people informed as we all deal with the profound ramifications, and rapid developments, associated with this crisis.

I am here today to inform you that today at my direction, the Commanding Officer of the USS Theodore Roosevelt, Captain Crozier, was relieved of command by the Carrier Strike Group Commander, Rear Admiral Stuart Baker.

The Executive Officer, Captain Dan Keeler, has assumed command temporarily until such time as Rear Admiral Select Carlos Sardiello arrives in Guam to assume command. Rear Admiral Select Sardiello is the former commanding officer of the Theodore Roosevelt so he is extremely well-acquainted with the ship, many members of its crew and the operations and capabilities of the ship itself. He is the best person in the Navy right now to take command under these circumstances.

As Secretary of the Navy, I could not be more proud of our men and women serving as part of the Navy and Marine Corps team. I can assure you that no one cares more than I do about their safety and welfare. I myself have a son in uniform, who is currently serving right now on active duty in Korea—one of the first nations in the world to have a significant spike in Coronavirus cases. I understand, both as a parent and a veteran, how critical our support lines are for the health and well-being of our people, especially now in the midst of a global pandemic.

But there is a larger strategic context, one full of national security imperatives, of which all our commanders must all be aware today. While we may not be at war in a traditional sense, neither are we truly at peace. Authoritarian regimes are on the rise. Many nations are reaching, in many ways, to reduce our capacity to accomplish our national goals. This is actively happening every day. It has been a long time since the Navy and Marine Corps team has faced this broad array of capable global strategic challengers. A more agile and resilient mentality is necessary, up and down the chain of command.

Perhaps more so than in the recent past, we require commanders with the judgment, maturity, and leadership composure under pressure to understand the ramifications of their actions within that larger dynamic strategic context. We all understand and cherish our responsibilities, and frankly our love, for all of our people in uniform, but to allow those emotions to color our judgment when communicating the current operational picture can, at best, create unnecessary confusion, and at worst, provide an incomplete picture of American combat readiness to our adversaries.

When the Commanding Officer of the USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT decided to write his letter of 30 March 2020 that outlined his concerns for his crew in the midst of a COVID-19 outbreak, the Department of the Navy had already mobilized significant resources for days in response to his previous requests. On the same date marked on his letter, my Chief of Staff had called the CO directly, at my request, to ensure he had all the resources necessary for the health and safety of his crew.

The CO told my Chief of Staff that he was receiving those resources, and was fully aware of the Navy’s response, only asking that the he wished the crew could be evacuated faster. My Chief of Staff ensured that the CO knew that he had an open line to me to use at any time. He even called the CO again a day later to follow up. At no time did the CO relay the various levels of alarm that I, along with the rest of the world, learned from his letter when it was published two days later.

Once I read the letter, I immediately called the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Gilday, and the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, ADM Aquilino. ADM Gilday had just read the letter that morning as well, and ADM Aquilino had it the day before. We had a teleconference within minutes of my reading of that article, including the Commander, SEVENTH Fleet, VADM William Merz, ADM Aquilino, ADM Gilday, the Department of the Navy’s Surgeon General, RADM Bruce Gillingham, and others. That evening, we held another teleconference with the entire chain of command.

The next day, I spoke with the CO of the THEODORE ROOSEVELT myself, and this morning, I have spoken to the TR’s Carrier Strike Group Commander, RDML Stuart Baker. RDML Baker did not know about the letter before it was sent to him via email by the CO. It is important to understand that the Strike Group Commander, the CO’s immediate boss, is embarked on the Theodore Roosevelt, right down the passageway from him. The letter was sent over non- secure, unclassified email even though that ship possesses some of the most sophisticated communications and encryption equipment in the Fleet.

It was sent outside the chain of command, at the same time the rest of the Navy was fully responding. Worse, the Captain’s actions made his Sailors, their families, and many in the public believe that his letter was the only reason help from our larger Navy family was forthcoming, which was hardly the case.

Command is a sacred trust that must be continually earned, both from the Sailors and Marines one leads, and from the institution which grants that special, honored privilege.

As I learned more about the events of the past week on board USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN-71), including my personal conversations with the Strike Group Commander, Commander, SEVENTH Fleet, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, the Chief of Naval Operations, and CAPT Crozier himself, I could reach no other conclusion than that Captain Crozier had allowed the complexity of his challenge with COVID breakout on the ship to overwhelm his ability to act professionally, when acting professionally was what was needed most. We do, and we should, expect more from the Commanding Officers of our aircraft carriers.

I did not come to this decision lightly. I have no doubt in my mind that Captain Crozier did what he thought was in the best interests of the safety and well-being of his crew. Unfortunately, it did the opposite. It unnecessarily raised alarms with the families of our Sailors and Marines with no plan to address those concerns. It raised concerns about the operational capabilities and operational security of the ship that could have emboldened our adversaries to seek advantage, and it undermined the chain of command who had been moving and adjusting as rapidly as possible to get him the help he needed.

For these reasons, I lost confidence in his ability to lead that warship as it continues to fight through this virus, get the crew healthy, so that it can continue to meet its national security requirements. In my judgement relieving him of command was in the best interests of the United States Navy and the nation in this time when the nation needs the Navy to be strong and confident in the face of adversity. The responsibility for this decision rests with me. I expect no congratulations for it, and it gives me no pleasure in making it. CAPT Crozier is an honorable man, who despite this uncharacteristic lapse of judgment, has dedicated himself throughout a lifetime of incredible service to our nation.

Pursuant to this action, and with my full support, the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gilday has directed the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert Burke, to conduct an investigation into the circumstances and climate of the entire Pacific Fleet to help determine what may have contributed to this breakdown in the chain of command. We must ensure we can count on the right judgment, professionalism, composure, and leadership from our Commanding Officers everywhere on our Navy and Marine Corps team, but especially in the Western Pacific. I have no indication that there is a broader problem in this regard, but we have obligation to calmly and evenly investigate that nonetheless.

To our Commanding Officers, it would be a mistake to view this decision as somehow not supportive of your duty to report problems, request help, protect your crews, and challenge assumptions as you see fit.

This decision is not one of retribution. It is about confidence. It is not an indictment of character, but rather of judgement. While I do take issue with the validity of some of the points in Captain Crozier’s letter, he was absolutely correct in raising them.

It was the way in which he did this, by not working through and with his Strike Group Commander to develop a strategy to resolve the problems he raised, by not sending the letter to and through his chain of command, by not protecting the sensitive nature of the information contained within the letter appropriately, and lastly by not reaching out to me directly to voice is concerns, after that avenue had been provided to him through my team, that was unacceptable.

Let me be clear, you all have a duty to be transparent with your respective chains of command, even if you fear they might disagree with you. This duty requires courage, but it also requires respect for that chain of command, and for the sensitivity of the information you decide to share and the manner you choose to share it.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I would like to send a message to the crew of the Theodore Roosevelt and their families back here at home. I am entirely convinced that your Commanding Officer loves you, and that he had you at the center of his heart and mind in every decision that he has made. I also know that you have great affection, and love, for him as well. But it is my responsibility to ensure that his love and concern for you is matched, if not exceeded by, his sober and professional judgement under pressure.

You deserve that throughout all the dangerous activities for which you train so diligently, but most importantly, for those situations which are unpredictable and are hard to plan for. It’s important because you are the TR, you are the Big Stick, and what happens onboard the TR matters far beyond the physical limits of your hull. Your shipmates across the fleet need for you to be strong and ready—and most especially right now they need you to be courageous in the face of adversity.

The nation needs to know that the Big Stick is undaunted, unstoppable —and that you will stay that way as we as a Navy help you through this COVID-19 challenge. Our adversaries need to know this as well. They respect and fear the Big Stick, and they should. We will not allow anything to diminish that respect and fear as you, and the rest of our nation, fights through this virus. As I stated, we are not at war by traditional measures, but neither are we at peace. The nation you defend is in a fight right now for our economic, personal and political security, and you are on the front lines of this fight in many ways.

You can offer comfort to your fellow citizens who are struggling and fearful here at home by standing the watch, and working your way through this pandemic with courage and optimism and set the example for the nation. We have an obligation to ensure you have everything you need as fast as we can get it there, and you have my commitment that we will not let you down. The nation you have sworn to defend is in a fight, and the nations and bad actors around the world who wish us harm should understand that the Big Stick is in the neighborhood and that her crew is standing the watch.

My only caveat is that Big Navy has a tendency to not understand the urgency of a request from the fleet.  While they are formulating their plans, the people on the front lines are becoming more and more frustrated.  There is a famous example of this with Lord Wellington's letter to the British Foreign Office.  You can read it here.  The mitigating circumstances here is that staffers today usually sit up and take notice when the Captain of one of our aircraft carriers send an urgent request.   

The other issue of note is the viral YouTube video of many in the crew chanting the CO's name as he walked down the brow for the last time.  It was a bit excruciating.  Those shipmates were sincere in their anguish.  They hated to see their CO being punished for looking out for them.  At the deck plate level this is understandable.  And it will make the job of the new CO all the more difficult.  But as the dust settles and the problems are attacked, most will hopefully understand the reasoning for the relief.  There are also a ton of uninformed folks on social media blaming the Navy and demanding that he be reinstated.  The key here is that they are well meaning, but ignorant of the responsibilities inherent in military command.  There is even a Change.org petition calling for this to happen.  But it isn't going to happen.  It can't happen.  And there is only one person who can make it happen.  I will be shocked and surprised if he does that and will lose a measure of respect for his judgement.  

So it's a tough situation in which there are no winners.  There never are in this kind of story.  It's an old Navy story and it never is easy.  But it's the right thing to do.

UPDATE:  I just saw that Capt Crozier has tested positive for Covid 19.  I pray for him and his family that he will come through this challenge.  

UPDATE 4/10:  It would probably be the better part of wisdom to just let this post sit there and let the story unfold as it will.  But we've all seen what has been happening since the Captain was relieved and I'm compelled to comment.  The most prominent event was that the Secretary of the Navy flew 8000 miles to address the crew of the TR and gooned it up in an epic manner.  He went aboard ship, got on the 1MC (the general announcing system) and proceeded to disparage the Captain and issue a profanity laced diatribe.  He came home, was immediately berated by the press and others in leadership positions and was forced to resign.  I think I know what happened with him.  He is a USNA grad and spent a couple tours as a JO.  He has fond memories of those simpler times aboard ship and when we stepped on the quarterdeck the memories came flooding back.  The smells, the sights, the sailors, the environment...he was back!  Except he wasn't.  He was most likely caught up in the moment.  Instead of being the strong SECNAV at the helm, he reverted to his days as a JO and decided to speak to the troops as one of them.  It clearly was a huge, huge mistake and one he will always regret.  But there is no fixing it and he is gone.  

Meanwhile, there is a new Acting SECNAV named who seems like a good and capable man.  And remember, there is a SECNAV in the nomination process.  He is the Ambassador to Norway.  Both have a Naval background...in a manner of speaking.  The Acting is a Navy JAG (lawyer) and the nominee was a Navy PAO (public affairs).  My question about both of these very accomplished and I'm sure capable men is where is their link to Naval strategy?  Many, if not most, interested watchers believe the service secretary jobs have become a bit of window dressing.  That is, they don't seem to have a role in the meat of the service, which is acquisition and strategy.  Oh they have directorates that are in charge of those functions, but if the person at the top lacks credibility, the impact is lessoned.  Let me be clear, this is just an observation.  It is what it is.  But in this time when strong and steady leadership is required, I'm not sure these are the men to provide it.  

The other disturbing thing I've seen in the last week is all the comments and observations from the peanut gallery.  To be sure, that always happens.  Everyone has a theory.  I've even engaged in a bit of it in the piece above.  Social media has allowed all who have a theory, from the most well-meaning but ignorant to the downright mean to enter the fray.  But in this case, the stakes are high.  It doesn't serve anyone to postulate a certainty.  Because we don't know.  My comments were largely in the realm of top level opinion.  I don't know what the day-to-day, minute-to-minute timeline and activity was.  And no one with a brain would comment on that.  

I've heard two common refrains.  "The Capt was just looking out for his crew and the Navy crucified him for it.  Anyone who speaks truth to power will be fired."  or "There's no doubt about his firing and he should be courtmartialed".  Both of these sentiments are typical social media responses that tend to drive toward the extremes.   But as I said right up front, the truth is somewhere in the middle.  So now the investigation is underway.  It will lead where it leads.  And someday (soon I hope) we'll all know what really happened.  I heard the CNO yesterday say that all options are on the table.  Many in the media took that to mean reinstatement.  I honestly don't know what that looks like.  Maybe it's been done, but I've never heard of it.  And if it was done, the howling from the Naval establishment might be pretty loud.